Abstract-Digital traces left by a user of an online social networking service can be abused by a malicious party to compromise the person's privacy. This is exacerbated by the increasing overlap in user-bases among various services. In this paper, we propose an algorithm, Seed and Grow, to identify users from an anonymized social graph based solely on graph structure. The algorithm first identifies a seed sub-graph, either planted by an attacker or divulged by collusion of a small group of users, and then grows the seed larger based on the attacker's existing knowledge of the users' social relations. Our work identifies and relaxes implicit assumptions taken by previous works, eliminates arbitrary parameters, and improves identification effectiveness and accuracy. Experiments on real-world collected datasets further corroborate our expectation and claim.
I. INTRODUCTION
A lunch-time walk across a university campus in the United States might lead one to marvel at the prevalence of Internetbased social networking services, among which Facebook and Twitter are two big players in the business. Indeed, as Alexa's "top 500 global sites" statistics retrieved on May 2011 indicates, Facebook and Twitter rank at 2nd and 9th place, respectively.
One characteristic of online social networking services is their emphasis on user and their connections, in addition to the content as in traditional Internet services. Online social networking services, while providing conveniences to users, accumulate a treasure of user-generated contents and users' social connections, which were only available to large telecommunication service providers and intelligence agencies a decade ago.
Online social networking data, once published, are of great interest to a large audience. For instance, with the massive social networking data sets, sociologists can verify hypotheses on social structures and human behavior patterns; third-party application developers can produce value-added services like games based on users' contact lists; advertisers can more accurately infer a user's demographic and preference profile and can thus issue targeted advertisements. Indeed, the 22 December 2010 revision of Facebook's Privacy Policy has the following clause, "we allow advertisers to choose the characteristics of users who will see their advertisements and we may use any of the non-personally identifiable attributes we have collected (including information you may have decided not to show to other users, such as your birth year or other sensitive personal information or preferences) to select the appropriate audience for those advertisements". Due to the strong correlation between users' data and the users' social identity, privacy is a major concern in dealing with social network data in contexts such as storage, processing and publishing. Privacy control, through which a user can tune the visibility of her profile, is an essential feature in any major social networking service.
The common practice for privacy-sensitive social network data publishing is through anonymization, i.e., removing plainly identifying labels such as name, social security number, postal or e-mail address, and retaining the structure of the network as published data. Figure 1 illustrates this process. The motivation behind such processing prior to data publishing is that, by removing the "who" information, the utility of the social networks is maximally preserved without compromising users' privacy. In several high-profile cases, anonymity has been unquestioningly interpreted as equivalent to privacy [1] .
Can the aforementioned "naive" anonymization technique achieve privacy preservation in the context of privacy-sensitive social network data publishing? This interesting and important question was posed only recently [2] . A few privacy attacks have been proposed to circumvent the naive anonymization protection [1, 2] . Meanwhile, more sophisticated anonymization techniques have been proposed to provide better privacy protection [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . Nevertheless, research in this area is still in its infancy and a lot of work, both in attacks and defenses, remains to be done.
In this paper, we describe a two-stage identification attack, Seed-and-Grow, against anonymized social networks. The name suggests a metaphor for visualizing its structure and procedure. The attacker first plants a seed into the target social network before its release. After the anonymized data is published, the attacker retrieves the seed and makes it grow larger, thereby further breaching privacy.
More concretely, our contributions include:
• We propose an efficient seed construction and recovery algorithm (Section III-A). More specifically, we drop the assumption that the attacker has complete control over the connection between the seed and the rest of the graph (Section III-A1); the seed is constructed in a way which is only visible to the attacker (Section III-A1); the seed recovery algorithm examines at most the two-hop local neighborhood of each node, and thus is efficient (Section III-A2).
• We propose an algorithm which grows the seed (i.e., further identifies users and hence violates their privacy) by exploiting the overlapping user bases among social network services. Unlike previous works which require arbitrary parameters for probing aggressiveness, our algorithm automatically finds a good balance between identification effectiveness and accuracy (Section III-B).
• We demonstrate the significant improvements in identification effectiveness and accuracy of our algorithm over previous works with real-world social-network datasets (Section IV). In light of the increasing overlapping user bases among social network services, businesses and government agencies should realize that privacy protection is not only an individual responsibility but also a social one. Our work calls for a re-evaluation of the current privacy-protection practices in publishing social-network data.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK A natural mathematical model to represent a social network is a graph. A graph G consists of a set V of vertices and a set E ⊆ V × V of edges. Labels can be attached to both vertices and edges to represent attributes.
In this context, privacy can be modeled as the knowledge of existence or absence of vertices, edges, or labels. An extension is to model privacy in terms of metrics, such as betweenness, closeness, and centrality, which originate from social network analysis studies [8] .
The naive anonymization is to remove those labels which can be uniquely associated with one vertex (or a small group of vertices) from V . This is closely related to traditional anonymization techniques employed on relational datasets [9] . However, the information conveyed in edges and its associated labels is susceptible to privacy breaches. Backstrom et al. [2] proposed an identification attack against anonymized graph and coined the term structural steganography.
Beside privacy, other dimensions in formulating privacy attacks against anonymized social networks, as identified in numerous previous works [4, 5, 7, 10] , are the published data's utility, and the attacker's background knowledge.
Utility of published data measures information loss and distortion in the anonymization process. The more information that is lost or distorted, the less useful published data is.
Existing anonymization schemes [3, 4, 5, 7, 10] are all based on the trade-off between the usefulness of the published data and the strength of protection. For example, Hay et al. [7] propose an anonymization algorithm in which the original social graph is partitioned into groups before publication, and "the number of nodes in each partition, along with the density of edges that exist within and across partitions", are published.
Although trade-off between utility and privacy is necessary, it is hard, if not impossible, to find a proper balance in general. Besides, it is hard to prevent attackers from proactively collecting intelligence on the social network. It is especially relevant today as major online social networking services provide APIs to facilitate third-party application development. These programming interfaces can be abused by a malicious party to gather information about the network.
Background knowledge characterizes the information in the attacker's possession which can be used to compromise privacy protection. It is closely related to what is perceived as privacy in a particular context. The attacker's background knowledge is not restricted to the target's neighborhood in a single network, but may span multiple networks and include the target's alter egos in all of these networks [1] . This is a realistic assumption. Consider the status quo in the social networking service business, in which service providers, like Facebook and Flickr, offer complementary services. It is very likely that a user of one service would simultaneously use another service. As a person registers to different social networking services, her social connections in these services, which relate to her social relationships in the real world, might reveal valuable information which the attacker can make use of to threaten her privacy.
The above observation inspires "Seed and Grow", which exploits the increasingly overlapping user-bases among social networking services. A concrete example is helpful in understanding this idea.
MOTIVATING SCENARIO. Bob, as an employee of a social networking service provider F-net, acquires from his employer a graph, in which vertices represent users and edges represent private chat logs. The edges are labeled with attributes such as timestamps. In accordance with its privacy policy, F-net has removed the user IDs from the graph before giving it to Bob.
Bob, being an inquisitive person, wants to know who these users are. Suppose, somehow, Bob identifies 4 of these users from the graph (this will become clear in the "Seed Construction" and "Seed Recovery" interludes in Section III-A). By using a graph (with the user ID tagged) he crawled a month ago from the website of another service provider T-net (the 4 identified persons are also users of T-net), and by carefully measuring structural similarity of these graphs, he manages to identify 100 more persons from the anonymized graph from Fnet (the "Dissimilarity" interlude in Section III-B will illustrate how to do this). By doing so, Bob defeats his employer's attempt to protect the customers' privacy.
We conclude this section with a brief comment on our choice of model. We use the undirected graph model to explain the proposed deanonymization attack on social networks. Undirected graphs arise naturally in scenarios where the social relation under investigation is mutual, e.g., friend requests must be confirmed in Facebook; directed graphs are more appropriate in other cases such as fans follow a movie star in Twitter. A undirected graph could be seen as a special case of directed graphs, in which the every relationship is reciprocal. As explained in Section III, the algorithms used in the proposed deanonymization attack do not rely on the fact that the target and background graphs are undirected; they work on directed graphs without any change. The choice of undirected graph model is for specificity and ease of presentation.
III. SEED AND GROW: THE ATTACK This section describes an attack that identifies users from an anonymized social graph. Let an undirected graph G T = {V T , E T } represent the target social network after anonymization. We assume that the attacker has an undirected graph G B = {V B , E B } which models his background knowledge about the social relationships among a group of people, i.e., V B are labeled with the identities of these people. The motivating scenario demonstrates one way to obtain G B . The attack concerned here is to infer the identities of the vertices V T by considering structural similarity between G T and G B .
We assume that, before the release of G T , the attacker obtains (either by creating or stealing) a few accounts and connects them with a few other users in G T (e.g., chatting in the motivating scenario). The attacker does not need much effort to do this because these are only basic operations in a social networking service. Besides user ID, the attacker knows nothing about the relationships between other users in G T . Furthermore, unlike previous works, we do not assume that the attacker has complete control over the connections; he just knows them before G T 's release. This is more realistic. An example is a confirmation-based social network, in which a connection is established only if the two parties confirm it: the attacker can decline but not impose a connection.
In contrast to a pure structure-based vertex matching algorithm [11] , Seed-and-Grow is a two-stage algorithm.
The seed stage plants (by obtaining accounts and establishing relationships) a small specially designed subgraph G F = {V F , E F } ⊆ G T (G F reads as "flag" or "fingerprint") into G T before its release. After the anonymized graph is released, the attacker locates G F in G T . The neighboring vertices V S of G F in G T are readily identified and serve as an initial seed to be grown.
The grow stage is essentially comprised of a structure-based vertex matching, which further identifies vertices adjacent to the initial seed V S . This is a self-reinforcing process, in which the seed grows larger as more vertices are identified.
A. Seed
Successful retrieval of G F in G T is guaranteed if G F exhibits the following structural properties.
• G F is uniquely identifiable, i.e., no subgraph
Therefore, they are structurally indistinguishable. • G F is asymmetric, i.e., G F does not have any nontrivial automorphism. For example, in Figure 2 , subgraph
In practice, since the structure of other nodes in the network is unknown to the attacker before its release, the uniquely identifiable property is not realizable. However, as was proved by Backstrom et al. [2] , with a large enough size and randomly generated edges under the Erdös-Rényi model [12] , G F will be uniquely identifiable with high probability.
Although a randomly generated graph G F is very likely to be uniquely identifiable in G T , it may violate the asymmetric structural property. However, because the goal of seed is to identify the initial seed V S rather than the flag G F , the asymmetric requirement for G F can be relaxed. For u ∈ V S , let V F (u) be the vertices in V F which connects with u (|V F (u)| ≥ 1 by the definition of V S ). For each pair of vertices, say u and v, in V S , as long as
| or the degree sequences are different; more precisely, no automorphism of G F exists which maps V F (u) to V F (v)), and once G F is recovered from G T , V S can be identified uniquely.
Based on these observations, we propose the following method for constructing and recovering G F .
1) Construction:
The construction of G F starts with a star structure. We call the vertex at the center of the star the head of G F and denote it by v h . In other words, v h connects to every other vertices in G F and no others.
The vertices in V F − {v h } are connected with some other vertices V S (the initial seed) in G T , which the attacker has no complete control over (he can only ensure that V F (u) = V F (v) for any pair of vertices u and v from V S by declining connections which render indistinguishable vertices in V S ).
As discussed before, the attacker has to ensure that no automorphism of G F will map V F (u) to V F (v). Therefore, he first connects pairs of vertices in V F − {v h } with a probability of p (in the fashion of the Erdös-Rényi model). Then, he collects the internal degree
Now, for every v ∈ V S , v has a corresponding subsequence S D (v) of S D according to its connectivity with V F . For example, in Figure 2 , v 6 connects to v 2 and v 3 from
. Therefore, the attacker guarantees unambiguous recovery of V S by ensuring that the randomly connected G F satisfies this condition. If not, the attacker will simply redo the random connection among V F − {v h } for all pairs va = v b in VF − {v h } do 6: Connect va and v b with a probability of p.
7:
end for 8: for all u ∈ VS do 9:
Find SD(u). 
, and S D (v 10 ) = 2, 3 . Since they are mutually distinct, V S can be uniquely identified once G F is recovered.
until it does (which it eventually will since we assume that V F (u) = V F (v) for any pair u and v from V S ). Algorithm 1 summarizes this procedure. SEED CONSTRUCTION. Bob had created 7 accounts v h and v 1 , . . . , v 6 , i.e., V F . He first connected v h with v 1 , . . . , v 6 . After a while, he noticed that users v 7 to v 10 are connected with v 1 , . . . , v 6 , i.e., V S = {v 7 , . . . , v 10 }.
Then, he randomly connected v 1 , . . . , v 6 and got the resulting graph G F as shown in Figure 3 . The ordered internal degree sequence S D = 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4 .
Bob found
, and S D (v 10 ) = 2, 3 . Since they are mutually distinct, Bob was sure that he could identify v 7 to v 10 once V F was found in the published anonymized graph.
The degree of head vertex v h , the ordered internal degree sequence S D and the subsequences chosen for V S are the secrets held by the attacker. As shown in Section III-A2, these secrets are used to recover G F from G T and thereafter to identify V S . From the defender's point of view, without knowing the secrets, there is no structure which characterizes G F due to the random nature in seed construction. Therefore, G F is visible only to the attacker.
2) Recovery: Once G F has been successfully planted and G T is released, the recovery of G F from G T consists of a systematic check of the attacker's secrets. The first step is to find a candidate u for the head vertex v h in G T by degree comparison. Then, the ordered internal degree sequence of the Algorithm 2 Seed recovery. 
if s(u) = SD then SEED RECOVERY. Bob started to check the anonymized graph G T to find the flag. He did this by examining all of the vertices in G T for one with degree 6. After he reached a candidate head v c with degree 6, he isolated it along with its candidate flag graph (red in Figure 3) , and the internal degrees for each of the neighbors. He found that the ordered internal degree sequence 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4 match with that of V F . He then proceeded to isolate v c 's exact 2-hop neighbors and checked their ordered internal degree subsequences with the candidate flag G c . He found they again matched with those of V S .
Bob was convinced that he had found G F . By matching the ordered internal degree subsequences of V c , he identified v 7 , v 8 , v 9 and v 10 . For example, for a 2-hop neighbor u ∈ V c , which is connected with three 1-hop neighbors with internal degrees 3, 3 and 4, he identified u with v 9 .
The motivation for incorporating the head vertex technique in the seed construction stage is clear now. The only connections v h has are internal ones. Therefore, once a candidate head vertex u is found, the candidate flag can be readily determined by reading off the 1-hop neighborhood of u. Thereafter, no probing or backtracking is needed for finding G F like in previous works [1, 2] .
The efficiency of the algorithm is evident by observing that, in Algorithm 2, the maximal level of nested loops is 3 (2 of them are on a vertex's neighborhood) and no recursion is involved. Because the 2-hop neighborhood of u v (e.g., V F ∪ V S ) is controlled by the attacker (as secrets), if the size (i.e., the number of vertices) of the 2-hop neighborhood is N , the complexity of the recovery algorithm is O(N |V T |).
B. Grow
The initial seed provides a firm ground for further identification in the anonymized graph G T . Background knowledge G B comes into play at this stage.
We have a partial mapping between G T and G B , i.e., the initial seed V S in G T maps to its corresponding identities in G B . Two examples of partial graph mappings are the Twitter and Flickr datasets [1] and the Netflix and IMDB datasets [13] . The straightforward idea of testing all possible mappings for the rest of the vertices has an exponential complexity, which is unacceptable even for a medium-sized network. Besides, the overlapping between G T and G B may well be partial, so a full mapping is either impossible or undesirable. Therefore, the grow algorithm adopts a progressive and self-reinforcing strategy, mapping multiple vertices for each round. Figure 4 shows a small example. v 7 to v 10 have already been identified in the seed stage (recall Figure 3) . The task is to identify other vertices in the target graph G T .
1) Dissimilarity:
The grow algorithm centers around a pair of dissimilarity metrics between a pair of vertices from the target and the background graph respectively. In order to enhance the identification accuracy and to reduce the computation complexity and the false-positive rate, we introduce a greedy heuristic with revisiting into the algorithm.
It is natural to start with those vertices in G T which connect to the initial seed V S because they are more close to the certain information, i.e., the already identified vertices V S . For these vertices, their neighboring vertices can be divided into two groups. Namely, for such a vertex u, its neighborhood in G T is composed of N Figure 4 . For a pair of nodes, u ∈ V T and v ∈ V B , we define the following pair of dissimilarity metrics:
and:
in which |·| is the number of set elements, i.e., set cardinality. We have Δ T (u * 1 , v 12 ) = |{u 7 , u 8 }|/|{u 7 , u 8 , u 9 }| = 2/3 ≈ 0.667, and Δ B (u * 1 , v 12 ) = |{v 10 }|/|{v 9 , v 10 }| = 1/2 = 0. 
The reason to have two asymmetric metrics (in regard to the target and background graphs) instead of a symmetric one is that we want to choose those mappings which are the mutually best choices for the graphs. Again, a concrete example helps. Figure 4 and got the results shown in Table I .
DISSIMILARITY Bob applied the dissimilarity metrics defined in Equations 1 and 2 to
Bob first identified the tuples in Table I which has the smallest Δ T and Δ B in both its row and column. In this case, these tuples are (u * 1 , v 11 ) and (u * 3 , v 12 ). Since they are from different rows and columns, they do not conflict with each other. So Bob decided to map u * 1 to v 11 and u * 3 to v 12 .
He then added v * 1 ↔ v 11 and v * 3 ↔ v 12 to the seed and moved on to the next iteration of identification.
2) Greedy Heuristic: Bob's story suggested a way of using the dissimilarity metrics defined in Equations 1 and 2 to iteratively grow the seed.
Since smaller dissimilarity implies better match, we identify those tuples in the table like Table I which has smallest Δ T and Δ B in both its row and column; these tuples are the mutually best matches between the target graph and the background graph. We then add the mappings corresponding to these tuples to the seed and move on to the next iteration.
We gloss over a subtlety in the above description: if there are conflicts in choice, i.e., there are more than one tuples satisfying the above criterion in a row or a column, which one shall we choose? Rather than randomly selecting a tuple, we select the tuple that stands out and add the corresponding match to the seed. If there is still a tie, these tuples are reckoned as indistinguishable under the dissimilarity metrics. To reduce incorrect identifications, we refrain from adding the mapping to the seed in these scenarios.
This boils down to the question of how to quantify the concept of "a tuple standing out among its peers". We define an eccentricity metric for this purpose in our algorithm. Let X be a group of numbers (the same number can occur multiple Algorithm 3 Grow. CT ← {u ∈ VT |u connects to VS}
5:
CB ← {v ∈ VB|v connects to VS} 6: if (CT , CB) ∈ C then for all (u, v) ∈ (CT , CB) do 11: Compute ΔT (u, v) and ΔB(u, v).
12:
end for
13:
S ← {(u, v)|ΔT (u, v) and ΔB(u, v) are smallest among conflicts} 14: for all (u, v) ∈ S do 15: if (u, v) has no conflict in S or (u, v) has the uniquely largest eccentricity among conflicts in S then end for 19: end loop times). The eccentricity of a number x ∈ X is defined as:
in which Δ X (x) is the absolute difference between x and its closest different value in X; # X (x) is the multitude of x in X, i.e., the number of elements equal to x in X; σ(X) is the standard deviation of X. The larger E X (x) is, the more x stands out among X. Therefore, if there are conflicts in a row, these tuples have the same Δ T and Δ B . For each such tuple, we collect the Δ T and Δ B in the same column into X T and X B respectively and compute E XT (Δ T ) and E XB (Δ B ). If there is a unique tuple with the largest E XT (Δ T ) and E XB (Δ B ), we pick it and add the corresponding mapping to the seed; otherwise, no mapping is added to the seed.
3) Revisiting: The dissimilarity metric and the greedy search algorithm for optimal combination are heuristic in nature. At an early stage with only a few seeds, there might be quite a few mapping candidates for a particular vertex in the background graph; we are very likely to pick a wrong mapping no matter which strategy is used in resolving the ambiguity. If left uncorrected, the incorrect mappings will propagate through the grow process and lead to large-scale mismatch.
We address this problem by providing a way to re-examine previous mapping decisions given new evidences in the grow algorithm; we call this revisiting. More concretely, for each iteration, we consider all vertices which have at least one seed neighbor, i.e., those pairs of vertices on which the dissimilarity metrics in Equations 1 and 2 are well-defined.
We expect the revisiting technique will increase the accuracy of the algorithm. The greedy heuristic with revisiting is summarized in Algorithm 3.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We conducted a comparative study on the performance of the Seed-and-Grow algorithm by simulation on real-world social network datasets.
A. Setup
We used two datasets collected from different real-world social networks in our study.
The Livejournal dataset, which was collected from the friend relationship of the online journal service, LiveJournal, on 9-11 December 2006 [14] , consists of 5.2 million vertices and 72 million links. The links are directed. As previously discussed at the end of Section II, we conducted the experiments with the more difficult setting of an undirected graph. We retained an undirected link between two vertices if there was a directed link in either direction.
The other dataset, emailWeek 1 , consists of 200 vertices and 1, 676 links. This dataset, by its nature, is undirected.
Using datasets collected from different underlying social networks helped to reduce bias induced by the idiosyncrasy of a particular network in performance measurements.
The performance of the grow algorithm was measured by its ability to identify the anonymous vertices in the target graph. We derived the target and background graphs from each dataset and used their shared vertices as the ground truth to measure against.
More precisely, we derived the graphs with the following procedure. First, we chose a connected subgraph with N ∩ vertices from the dataset, which served as a shared portion of the background and target graphs. We then picked other two sets of vertices (different from the previous N ∩ vertices) with N B − N ∩ and N T − N ∩ vertices, respectively, and combined with shared portion graph to obtain the background graph (with N B vertices) and the target graph (with N T vertices). After this, N S (N S < N ∩ and not necessarily connected) vertices were chosen from the shared portion to serve as the initial seed. Finally, random edges were added to the target graph to simulate the difference between the target and background graphs.
B. Seed
The Seed construction (Algorithm 1) and recovery (Algorithm 2) algorithms ensure that, once the flag graph G F is successfully recovered, the initial seed V S can be unambiguously identified. Therefore, the seed construction depends on G F being uniquely recovered from the released target graph.
We randomly generated a number of modest-sized flag graphs with 10 to 20 vertices and planted them into the Livejournal dataset with Algorithm 1. We were able to uniquely recover them from the resulted graph with Algorithm 2 without exception.
To explain this result, we made the following estimation on the number of essentially different (i.e., with different ordered internal degree sequence S D ) constructions produced by Algorithm 1.
For a flag graph G F with n vertices, there are n−1 vertices beside the head node v h . There are (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 pairs among the n − 1 vertices; the edge between each pair of vertices can be either present or absent. Therefore, there are 2 (n−1)(n−2)/2 different flag graphs. However, some of them are considered the same by Algorithm 1. For example, the ordered internal degree sequence S D = 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 4 in Figure 3 . There are 3, 2, and 1 vertices with an internal degree of 2, 3, and 4, respectively; hence, there are 
(n − 1)! . Table II shows this estimate for a few different flag graph sizes. From this, we can understand the reason for the high probability for successful flag graph recovery, even in a large graph like Livejournal with 5.2 × 10 6 vertices: there are so many ways to construct essentially different flag graphs.
C. Grow
We compared our grow algorithm with the one proposed by Narayanan and Shmatikov [1] . There is a mandatory threshold parameter, which controls the probing aggressiveness, in their algorithm. Narayanan and Shmatikov [1] did not give a quantitative guideline to choose this parameter; we experimented with different values and found that, with increasing threshold, more nodes were identified but the accuracy decreased accordingly. Therefore, we used two different thresholds, which established a performance envelope for the Narayanan algorithm. The result was two variants of the algorithm: an aggressive one (with a threshold of 0.0001) and a conservative one (with a threshold of 1). The difference lay in the tolerance to the ambiguities in matching: the aggressive one might declare a mapping in a case where the conservative one would deem as too ambiguous.
To account for the bias on the performance measurement of a particular graph setting, for each target/background graph pair, we ran multiple simulations with different initial seeds and took the average as the performance measurement. We focused our simulations on graphs with hundreds of vertices, which are big enough to make the identification nontrivial. More precisely, we chose (N C = 400 + N S , N T = 600 + N S , N B = 600 + N S ) for Livejournal and (N C = 100 + N S , N T = 125 + N S , N B = 125 + N S ) for emailWeek. In other words, the ideal result is to correctly identify 400 + N S nodes for Livejournal and 100 + N S nodes for emailWeek where N S is the size of initial seed.
1) Initial Seed Size: Recent literature [15] on interactionbased social graphs (e.g., the social graph in the motivating scenario) singles out the attacker's interaction budget as the major limitation to attack effectiveness. The limitation translates to 1) the initial seed size and 2) the number of links between the flag graph and the initial seed. Our seed algorithm resolves the latter issue by guaranteeing unambiguous identification of the initial seed regardless of link numbers. As shown below, our grow algorithm resolves the former issue by working well with a small initial seed. Figure 5 shows the grow performance with different initial seed sizes. To simulate the more realistic case that the target and background graphs are from different sources and therefore might differ even among the same group of vertices, we introduced an edge perturbation of 0.5%, i.e., we added 0.5% of the all of the edges in the target graph.
We note a few points for Figure 5 . 1). More nodes are correctly identified with increasing initial seed size for both Seed-and-Grow and Narayanan.
2). Seed-and-Grow is better (or at least comparable) to the aggressive Narayanan in terms of number of correct identifications and is superior when comparing with conservative Narayanan. For Livejournal, conservative Narayanan stops almost immediately (the correct identification statistics shown in Figure 5 include the initial seed). In contrast, even for very small initial seed of 5 nodes, Seed-and-Grow correctly identifies an average of 32 nodes for Livejournal and 62 nodes for emailWeek while only incorrectly identifying 1 node on average.
3). Though aggressive Narayanan correctly identifies more nodes as the seed size grows, the number of incorrect identification grows accordingly. This is especially evident in Livejournal. In contrast, the incorrect identification number for Seed-and-Grow remains constant in emailWeek and grows very slowly in Livejournal; in either case, the percentage of correct identification, as defined by the number of correct identifications over the total number of identified nodes, is much higher for Seed-and-Grow than for aggressive Narayanan.
An ideal grow algorithm should be both effective and accurate. Effectiveness is measured by the number of correct identification; accuracy is measured by the percentage of correct identification. Figure 5 shows Seed-and-Grow is 1). comparable to aggressive Narayanan in terms of effectiveness while better in terms of accuracy; 2). comparable to conservative Narayanan in terms of accuracy while better in terms of effectiveness.
It is arguable that, with a "proper" threshold, Narayanan will show the same or even superior performance than Seedand-Grow. However, lacking any quantitative guideline, such a proper threshold is hard, if not impossible, to find for the vast array of graphs the identification algorithm applies to. Even if one can find such a threshold, it is unclear that its performance will be superior to that of Seed-and-Grow. In contrast, Seedand-Grow has no such arbitrary parameter. The point is that Seed-and-Grow automatically finds a sensible balance between effectiveness and accuracy.
2) Edge Perturbation: The impact of edge perturbations on the grow performance is shown in Figure 6 . The initial seed size was 15.
Correct identifications decreased with a larger edge pertur- bation percentage for all algorithms. Incorrect identifications increased with edge perturbation for aggressive Narayanan while remaining at a constant level for Seed-and-Grow and conservative Narayanan. Seed-and-Grow is more effective than conservative Narayanan in all settings. Although aggressive Narayanan is more effective than Seed-and-Grow for larger perturbation percentage, it comes at a much higher cost in accuracy; for Livejournal, aggressive Narayanan makes more incorrect identifications than correct ones. In contrast, the number of incorrect identifications for Seed-and-Grow remain almost constant with different perturbation percentages.
A high accuracy (i.e., a high percentage of correct identifications) is desirable, even at a reasonable cost of effectiveness (fewer nodes identified). This is because, lacking the knowledge about whether or not an identification is correct, accuracy corresponds to the user's confidence in the identification result. For example, in Figure 6c , even though aggressive Narayanan correctly identifies 109 nodes on average while Seed-andGrow only correctly identifies 70 nodes on average, the former incorrectly identifies 128 nodes on average while the latter only incorrectly identifies 20 nodes on average. Without knowing which nodes are correctly identified, a user has less than 50% confidence in the results of aggressive Narayanan while having more than 75% confidence in the results of Seedand-Grow.
On reflection, we attribute the relatively high accuracy of Seed-and-Grow to the conservative design in our grow algorithm (Algorithm 3). More specifically, we add a mapping to the seed (i.e., grow the seed) if and only if 1) it is the mutually best choice for the pair of nodes under the dissimilarity metric and 2) it stands out among alternative choices in the sense that it has no tie under the eccentricity metric. Besides, the algorithm further improves accuracy by revisiting earlier mappings in light of new mappings.
V. CONCLUSION
We propose an algorithm, Seed-and-Grow, to identify users from an anonymized social graph. Our algorithm exploits the increasing overlapping user-bases among services and is based solely on social graph structure. The algorithm first identifies a seed sub-graph, either planted by an attacker or divulged by collusion of a small group of users, and then grows the seed larger based on the attacker's existing knowledge of the users' social relations. We identify and relax implicit assumptions for unambiguous seed identification taken by previous works, eliminate arbitrary parameters in grow algorithm, and demonstrate the superior performance over previous works in terms of identification effectiveness and accuracy by simulations on real-world-collected social-network datasets.
In the future, we plan to incorporate tagging (known mappings from external information) into our structural-based grow algorithm, which we expect will further increase identification effectiveness and accuracy.
